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Summary 
The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has been a long-standing concern of Congress. 
Although Congress has established a wide variety of tax preferences, direct subsidies, import 
restraints, and other federal programs with the goal of retaining or recapturing manufacturing 
jobs, only a small proportion of U.S. workers is now employed in factories. Meanwhile, U.S. 
factories have stepped up production of goods that require high technological sophistication but 
relatively little direct labor. Labor productivity in manufacturing, as measured by government 
data, has grown rapidly, suggesting that the manufacturing sector as a whole remains healthy. 
Recent data, however, challenge the belief that the manufacturing sector, taken as a whole, will 
continue to flourish. Unlike previous expansions, the two most recent cyclical upturns in the U.S. 
economy have generated few jobs in manufacturing. Moreover, statistics suggest that domestic 
value represents a diminishing share of the value of U.S. factory output. One interpretation of 
these data is that manufacturing is “hollowing out” as companies undertake a larger proportion of 
their high-value work abroad. These developments raise the question of whether the United States 
will continue to generate highly skilled, high-wage jobs related to advanced manufacturing. 
The evidence concerning “hollowing out” is ambiguous, as conceptual issues and statistical 
deficiencies make it difficult to determine whether the recent decline in manufacturing value 
added, relative to shipments, is a short-term phenomenon or a long-term trend. Despite 
improvements in recent years, U.S. statistical agencies still tend to treat manufacturing and 
services as unrelated economic activities, and it is not clear that existing data series on domestic 
economic activity, trade, and freight transportation adequately capture changes in the nature of 
manufacturing, the sources of employment, and the creation of value. 
Nonetheless, evidence suggests strongly that physical production activities account for a 
diminishing share of the final value of manufactured products, with service-related inputs such as 
research, product development, and marketing becoming more important. Further, the production 
of many goods is dispersed across multiple locations along global supply chains, making it 
difficult to determine where value is added. Such shifts pose a challenge to efforts to capture 
economic value by promoting goods production in the United States. 
In the context of national security, the fact that U.S. manufacturers of vital products are critically 
dependent upon inputs from abroad is frequently a subject of concern. International comparisons 
indicate that the United States is in no way unique in its dependence on foreign inputs to 
manufacturing. Although the output of U.S. factories contains a large proportion of foreign value 
added, many other countries appear to be even more dependent upon foreign value added than is 
the United States, at least with respect to goods traded in international markets. 
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Introduction 
The health of the U.S. manufacturing sector has been a major concern of Congress for more than 
three decades. Over the years, Congress has enacted a wide variety of tax preferences, direct 
subsidies, import restraints, and other federal programs intended to bolster the manufacturing 
sector, often with the goal of retaining or recapturing highly paid manufacturing jobs. 
Only a small proportion of U.S. workers is now employed in factories, as manufacturers have 
shifted low-value, labor-intensive production, such as apparel and shoe manufacturing, to other 
countries. Meanwhile, U.S. factories have stepped up production of goods that require high 
technological sophistication but relatively little direct labor. Despite highly publicized factory 
closures, the good-producing capacity of the U.S. economy remains near its all-time peak, as 
measured by the Federal Reserve Board. 
Recent data, however, challenge the belief that the manufacturing sector, taken as a whole, will 
continue to flourish. In particular, statistics showing that domestic value added represents a 
diminishing share of the value of U.S. factory output have been interpreted by many analysts as 
indicating that manufacturing is “hollowing out” as U.S. manufacturers undertake more high-
value work abroad. Economic data have been slow to take note of this development, which raises 
the question of whether the United States will continue to generate highly skilled, high-wage jobs 
related to advanced manufacturing. 
This report discusses economic evidence related to the “hollowing out” thesis with respect to the 
manufacturing sector. It then considers the policy implications of the debate. 
The Health of U.S. Manufacturing 
The United States has a very large manufacturing sector. In 2011, manufacturers’ shipments 
reached $5.4 trillion, more than one-third of the gross domestic product and 11% above the level 
of 2010. Although many factories closed or reduced production during the 2007-2009 recession, 
output has rebounded since the summer of 2009. In February 2013, the Federal Reserve Board’s 
index of industrial production in manufacturing reached the highest seasonally adjusted level 
since June 2008, only 4% below the high recorded in December 2007.1 
This cyclical recovery, however, has not stilled concerns about the sector’s health. The number of 
U.S. manufacturing sites fell from 397,552 in 2001 to 335,553 as of September 2012, leaving 
many factories abandoned.2 Manufacturing employment, which peaked at 19.4 million in 1979, 
was 11.98 million in March 2013. Of those 12 million manufacturing workers, only 8.3 million, 
or 5.4% of the civilian labor force, are now engaged in factory production work. The remaining 
3.7 million manufacturing workers are engaged in management, product development, marketing, 
and other nonproduction activities conducted within manufacturing establishments. 
                                                 
1 Industrial production and capacity data are published in the Federal Reserve Board’s monthly G.17 release, available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G17/Current/default.htm. 
2 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “County Employment and Wages,” http://www.bls.gov/cew, viewed April 9, 2013. 
Figure for September 2012 is preliminary. 
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These broad trends—generally expanding manufacturing output coupled with minimal job 
creation—are of long standing. In combination, they are taken as indicators of rapidly rising 
productivity. Labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing, defined as output per work hour, has 
increased 16% since 2005 and 45% since 2000 as manufacturers have shifted away from labor-
intensive production. A rapid rise in productivity would be consistent with the belief that U.S. 
manufacturing is becoming more efficient and technologically sophisticated and therefore 
requires less labor; one analogy might be the farm sector, in which the labor force has shrunk to a 
small fraction of its size a century ago despite a vast increase in output. 
The estimates of rising manufacturing output and capacity and of rapidly improving labor 
productivity, however, rely critically on price adjustments that attempt to account for 
improvements in the quality of computers and certain other high-technology products. Such 
adjustments are required because, for example, simply measuring changes in the quantity or value 
of the computers produced each year would have little economic meaning given the very rapid 
increase in those computers’ capabilities.3 
Government statistical agencies address this problem by making highly technical adjustments 
when measuring certain prices. These adjustments can affect prominent economic indicators, such 
as gross domestic product and labor productivity. The industries for which data are adjusted in 
this way, such as semiconductor manufacturing, are among the most vigorous in U.S. 
manufacturing, leading to questions about whether reported improvements in manufacturing 
represent real changes or are merely the result of statistical adjustments.4 
While some data thus indicate that U.S. manufacturing is resilient and recovering well from the 
2007-2009 recession, two facts in particular support the argument that the manufacturing sector is 
more challenged than the government’s output and productivity measures imply:  
• Unlike previous expansions, the two most recent cyclical upturns in the U.S. 
economy have not brought more jobs in manufacturing. Factory output rose 
roughly 20% from the trough of the 2001 recession through 2007 without 
generating factory jobs. This pattern has repeated itself since June 2009; both 
total manufacturing employment and manufacturing production employment in 
March 2013 were only 2% higher than at in June 2009, the deepest point of the 
2007-2009 recession, despite a 20.8% increase in factory output. 
• By some measures, value added by U.S. manufacturing establishments appears to 
represent a declining share of the value of factory shipments. If this measurement 
is correct, although total factory output is rising, the measured contribution of 
U.S. workers to the value of the final products may not be keeping pace. Some 
commentators refer to this phenomenon as “hollowing out.” 
                                                 
3 For an explanation of this adjustment process, see Dave Wasshausen and Brent R. Moulton, “The Role of Hedonic 
Methods in Measuring Real GDP in the United States,” October 12-13, 2006, http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/
hedonicGDP.pdf. 
4 Susan Houseman, Timothy Bartik, and Timothy Sturgeon, “Measuring Manufacturing: Problems of Interpretation and 
Biases in the U.S. Statistics,” working paper, February 2013. See also David Byrne, Brian K. Kovak, and Bryan 
Michaels, “Offshoring and Price Measurement in the Semiconductor Industry,” in Susan N. Houseman and Kenneth F. 
Ryder, eds., Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization (Washington, DC: National Academy of 
Public Administration, 2010), pp. 169-194. 
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What Is Value Added? 
Value added represents one measure of the health of manufacturing. Conceptually, value added 
equals the value of manufacturers’ shipments less the value of purchased inputs. Employees’ pay 
and benefits, depreciation of capital investment, business income taxes, and returns to business 
owners all are components of value added. In essence, value added is meant to capture the share 
of the value of final products that is being added “in house.” Value added is typically assessed 
with two different metrics. One metric, the growth rate of “real” value added, provides 
information about the expansion of industrial output but is subject to the technology-related 
adjustment issues discussed above. The other metric, which avoids these adjustment issues, is the 
ratio of each year’s manufacturing value added to that year’s manufacturing shipments.  
For an individual firm, a decline in the ratio of value added to shipments may not be meaningful. 
To see why, consider a firm that produces a component, uses the component to make another 
product, and sells that product. If the firm were to split itself in half, so that one entity makes the 
component and sells it to a separate entity that makes the finished product, manufacturers’ total 
shipments would increase but total value added would not change. The resulting decline in the 
ratio of value added to shipments would have no economic significance. 
The situation may be different, however, at the level of an industry or of the manufacturing sector 
as a whole. In these cases, a lower ratio of value added to shipments could reveal important 
changes. One might be diminished profitability. Another might be that manufacturers’ costs for 
certain inputs, such as electricity or paperboard cartons, are rising faster than the prices 
manufacturers receive for their products. A third possibility could be that manufacturers are 
collectively making greater use of imported parts and components.  
From 1990 through 2005, U.S. manufacturing value added fluctuated in a narrow range, between 
46.3% and 48.5% of the value of manufacturers’ shipments, according to Census Bureau 
estimates. Since 2006, however, the ratio has remained below 44.8% (see Figure 1). The decline 
in the ratio, which began in 2003, predated the 2007-2009 recession. The ratio of value added to 
shipments as measured by the Census Bureau was 41.7% in 2011, well below the average of the 
past two decades. 
Data compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), using different methods, show a 
generally similar trend, save for a spike in the manufacturing value-added ratio in 2009. 
According to BEA’s estimates, the value-added ratio was 31.95% in 2011 and 32.5% in the first 
half of 2012, well below the 34.3% average since 1987.5  
                                                 
5 These estimates were calculated from BEA’s gross domestic product by industry tables and, for 2012, BEA’s 
prototype quarterly statistics on U.S. Gross Domestic Product by Industry, viewed April 10, 2013, at 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/index.htm. 
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Figure 1. Manufacturers’ Value Added 
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufactures, and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
The interpretation of the trends in the two data series reported in Figure 1 is a matter of 
controversy among economists. A number of conceptual issues and statistical deficiencies 
complicate interpretation. Among the most important of these problems are the following. 
• Accounting for purchased services. The Census Bureau includes 
manufacturers’ outlays for telecommunications, advertising, transportation, and 
other services purchased from third parties in their value added, but BEA does 
not. This is the main reason the Census measurement of value added relative to 
sales is normally 9 to 12 percentage points higher than the BEA measurement. 
Census treats services purchased by manufacturers differently from materials 
purchased by manufacturers, which are excluded from its measurement of value 
added. Conceptually, there is no reason for this difference, but until recently the 
government lacked reliable data on purchased services, and a change in the 
Census methodology now would affect long-term comparability.6 
• Accounting for research and development. Government statistics include the 
costs of a manufacturer’s research and development staff in value added in the 
same way as the costs of its production employees. Economists have long 
                                                 
6 For discussion of this issue, see Robert E. Yuskavage, Eric H. Strassner, and Gabriel W. Medeiros, “Domestic 
Outsourcing and Imported Inputs in the U.S. Economy: Insights from Integrated Economic Accounts,” May 15, 2008, 
http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/yuskavage_outsource.pdf, p. 40. 
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debated whether research and development should be treated instead as 
investment. BEA estimates that this accounting change would have raised the 
annual growth rate of value added in private industry slightly between 1995 and 
2007, and that it would have caused value added in certain high-tech sectors, 
notably pharmaceutical, instrument, and aerospace manufacturing, to grow faster 
than official statistics indicate. BEA will begin publishing data treating corporate 
research and development spending as investment in 2013.7  
• Intellectual property exports. Many companies conduct research and 
development in the United States and use or license the resulting designs, patents, 
and brand names for manufacturing abroad. In principle, if this intellectual 
property is licensed to a foreign producer, whether or not owned by a U.S.-based 
company, it appears in U.S. trade data as a services export. However, the 
measurement of value added can become blurred if the foreign-made product is 
then imported into the United States to be incorporated into other goods; U.S. 
data on manufacturing may not adequately correct for the fact that some of the 
import’s value was originally created in the United States or may categorize that 
U.S. value added as a product of the service sector rather than the manufacturing 
sector. Moreover, if the intellectual property is licensed from a U.S. operation to 
a foreign operation with a single multinational company, the licensing fee may 
not reflect the true economic value of the intellectual property. These 
complexities tend to make U.S. manufacturing value added appear smaller than it 
really is, and this bias may have increased over time as “offshoring” of assembly 
work has become more common.  
• Factoryless manufacturing. A growing number of companies widely considered 
to be manufacturers—perhaps the best known is the electronics company Apple 
Inc.—specialize in certain processes, such as design, distribution, or service, but 
perform little or no physical production themselves.8 The activities of such 
“factoryless manufacturers” may show up in government data as “wholesale 
trade” rather than as “manufacturing,” leading to the possibility that an increasing 
proportion of products with high U.S. value added are being omitted from the 
calculation of manufacturing output and value added. If this occurs, it may have 
contributed to the measured decline in the value-added ratio through most of the 
past decade. New internationally agreed statistical procedures would change the 
treatment of outsourcing by basing measurement of goods exports and imports on 
transfer of ownership.9 Conceptually, for example, if a company makes 
semiconductors in Texas, ships them to Mexico for assembly into a finished 
                                                 
7 Jennifer Lee and Andrew G. Schmidt, “Research and Development Satellite Account Update,” Survey of Current 
Business, December 2010, pp. 16-27. For an exploration of some of the complexities arising from measurement of 
research and development, see Wendy C.Y. Li, “Depreciation of Business R&D Capital,” October 2012, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/WendyLiDepreciationBusinessR&DCapital20130314BEAwebversion.pdf, and Carol 
Robbins, Olympia Belay, Matthew Donahoe, and Jennifer Lee, “Industry-level Output Price Indexes for R&D: An 
Input-cost Approach with R&D Productivity Adjustment,” December 10, 2012, http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/
industry_level_output_price_indexes_for_r_and_d.pdf. 
8 Apple, Inc., Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 20, 2012, p. 12, states that “substantially all of the 
Company’s manufacturing is performed in whole or in part by a few outsourcing partners located primarily in Asia.” 
The only company-owned factory mentioned is in Cork, Ireland. 
9 For details, see Maureen Doherty, “Reflecting Factoryless Goods Production in the U.S. Statistical System,” working 
paper, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2013. 
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product, and then sells the finished product in the United States, the value of the 
semiconductors would henceforth count neither as an export nor as an import, 
and the value of the assembly work in Mexico would count as a U.S. import of 
manufacturing services rather than of goods. U.S. statistical agencies are still 
evaluating whether they can obtain the data necessary to measure trade in this 
way.10 According to a recent study by three Federal Reserve Board economists, if 
“factoryless manufacturing” is reclassified as a manufacturing activity rather than 
a wholesale trade activity, both total manufacturing shipments and U.S. value 
added in manufacturing are likely to be significantly larger than under current 
statistical procedures.11 
• Price biases. Import price indexes play a critical role in measuring value added 
in manufacturing. Around 40% of all imports are inputs for business use, such as 
parts and components, rather than consumer goods. Government statistics may 
understate the declines in input prices if manufacturers are shifting quickly from 
using a domestic input to a competing foreign-made input that is lower in cost. If 
this is occurring, it would mean that U.S. factories are using a greater quantity of 
the foreign input than assumed, and less of the domestically made alternative. 
These measurement problems may result in official data overstating the output of 
U.S. manufacturing workers, and hence their productivity, while understating the 
use of imported components in U.S. factories. This implies that value added in 
U.S. factories may be lower than statistics indicate.12 
Table 1 summarizes the effects of these various measurement issues on reported value added in 
the manufacturing sector. The net effect is ambiguous. Although the statistical problems are 
serious, it is uncertain, on balance, whether they collectively make value added larger or smaller, 
relative to manufacturers’ shipments, and whether they change the growth rate of value added in 
manufacturing. 
                                                 
10 Fariha Kamal, Brent R. Moulton, and Jennifer Ribarsky, “Measuring ‘Factoryless’ Manufacturing: Evidence from 
U.S. Surveys,” working paper, March 2013. On the justification for this change, see Office of Management and Budget, 
“North American Industry Classification System; Revision for 2012,” Federal Register vol. 76, no. 159, August 17, 
2011, p. 51241, and U.S. Census Bureau, “Economic Classification Policy Committee (ECPC) Recommendation for 
Classification of Outsourcing in North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Revisions for 2012,” May 
12, 2010, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/fr2010/
ECPC%20Recommendation%20for%20Classification%20of%20Outsourcing.doc. 
11 Kimberly Bayard, David Byrne, and Dominic Smith, “The Scope of U.S. Factoryless Manufacturing,” working 
paper, February 28, 2013, estimate that the value of shipments in manufacturing would have been 7% to 30% higher 
than measured in the 2002 and 2007 Economic Censuses if “factoryless manufacturing” had been classified as 
manufacturing rather than wholesale trade. Their detailed analysis of the semiconductor industry finds that the sector’s 
value added would have been approximately 25% larger than measured in 2002 and 2007 if the output of companies 
that outsource production to a foreign contract manufacturer had been counted as manufacturing. 
12 Susan N. Houseman, “Offshoring and Import Price Measurement,” Survey of Current Business, February 2011, pp. 
7-11; Susan Houseman, Christopher Kurz, Paul Lengerman, and Benjamin Mandel, “Offshoring Bias in U.S. 
Manufacturing,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 25, no. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 111-132. 
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Table 1. Summary of Measurement Issues Affecting Value Added in Manufacturing 
Measurement Issue Effect on Measured Value Added 
Inclusion of Purchased Services in Value 
Added 
Positive 
Treatment of In-House Research and 
Development as Expense Rather Than 
Investment 
Negative 
Misattribution of Intellectual Property 
Exports 
Negative 
Misclassification of Some Factoryless 
Manufacturing 
Negative 
Import Price Overstatement Positive 
Source: Interviews and literature reviewed by CRS. 
The Impact of Global Supply Chains 
The declining share of domestic value added in particular industries is related to a broad change 
in businesses’ strategies that emphasizes the use of global supply chains.13 In such arrangements, 
made possible by low freight transportation and communication costs, a retailer or manufacturer 
organizes its production on a worldwide basis rather than on a country-by-country basis. It may 
then obtain economies of scale in manufacturing by using a factory in one country to supply most 
or all of its need for a particular product worldwide, shipping intermediate inputs from place to 
place for additional processing in order to deliver the final product at the lowest total cost.  
The globalization of supply chains manifests itself in the increased use of imported inputs—so-
called “intermediate inputs”—by manufacturers. This trend is strongly in evidence in the United 
States.14 In 1998, 24% of intermediate inputs used in U.S. manufacturing were imported. 
According to one analysis, the figure started rising in 2003 and reached 34% in 2006. Moreover, 
U.S. factories’ use of domestic components and other materials (excluding energy) is estimated to 
have declined at an annual rate of 3.9% between 1998 and 2006, while their use of imported 
components and materials is estimated to have risen at a 3.5% rate.15 
One consequence of increased reliance on international supply chains has been an increase in the 
share of manufactured goods’ final value that is imported. This appears to be the case not just for 
the United States, but globally. According to a recent study for the World Bank, “For the world as 
a whole, there has been a discernible drop in the value added content of exports, relative to gross 
exports, since 1992.” In 1992, for example, 45% of the value of machinery exports worldwide 
was added in the exporting country; by 2007, that figure had fallen to 35%. In the case of 
                                                 
13 CRS Report R40167, Globalized Supply Chains and U.S. Policy, by Dick K. Nanto. A growing academic literature 
examines global supply chains. Among the early examples is Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds., Commodity 
Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).  
14 On the challenges of measuring the use of intermediate imports, see Robert C. Feenstra and J. Bradford Jensen, 
“Evaluating Estimates of Materials Offshoring from U.S. Manufacturing,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 17916, March 2012.  
15 Lucy P. Eldridge and Michael J. Harper, “Effects of imported intermediate inputs on productivity,” Monthly Labor 
Review, June 2006, pp. 6, 12. 
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transportation equipment, value added in exporting countries accounted for 37% of export sales in 
1992, but only 27% in 2007.16 
If domestic value added relative to sales is a valid measure of “hollowing out,” then the United 
States may be experiencing less “hollowing out” than other major trading nations, at least with 
respect to exports (see Figure 2). According to 2009 data compiled by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the United States ranked third among 40 countries in the share of export value produced 
domestically, and ranked first in share of domestic value added in exports of electrical and optical 
equipment.17 
Figure 2. Domestic Value Added in Exports 
Percent of Gross Value, 2009 
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Source: OECD-WTO Statistics on Trade in Value Added, “Total domestic value added share of gross exports.” 
The data used in Figure 2 attempt to incorporate the value of imported services in foreign value 
added, alongside the value of imported components and raw materials. In principle, for example, 
if a Chinese component producer pays a licensing fee to a U.S. firm for use of a patent and then 
exports the resulting component to the United States, the licensing fee should count as imported 
value added in the Chinese export, and it should not count as imported value added in the U.S. 
product made with the Chinese component. However, the extent to which inputs imported into the 
United States contain value added in the exporting country, the United States, or third countries is 
uncertain due to the same conceptual factors that complicate analysis of U.S. value added in 
manufacturing. 
                                                 
16 OECD-WTO, Statistics on Trade in Value Added, (database) doi: 10.1787/data-00648-en, viewed April 10, 2013. 
17 International Monetary Fund, “Changing Patterns of Global Trade,” p. 10, June 15, 2011, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2011/061511.pdf. 
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A recent study of the automotive seat industry illustrates the potential for confusion about the 
impact of global supply chains on national economies. U.S. imports of automobile seats have 
declined since 1994, suggesting, at first glance, that auto manufacturers are making greater use of 
U.S. content. More detailed analysis, however, shows that imports of seat parts, mainly from 
Mexico, have increased sharply. These imports consist of items such as fabrics and temperature-
control devices, which may not be readily identified as auto-related.18 Collectively, such imports 
reduce the amount of measured U.S. content in the seat and in the vehicle in which the seat is 
installed.19 However, it may not be possible to determine the value of U.S. licenses and patent 
fees paid by the manufacturers of those imported fabrics and temperature-control devices. If that 
U.S.-origin intellectual property has accounted for an increasing share of the value of the foreign-
made seat components over time, then the reported decline in the domestic content of finished 
seats may be entirely spurious. 
Data on the amount of U.S. content embedded in imported products have been developed only 
recently, and change over extended time periods cannot be tracked reliably. Data on various 
manufacturing sectors from the OECD-WTO database indicate that the United States is similar to 
other major manufacturing countries in the share of import value that can be attributed to 
domestic production (see Table 2).20 
Table 2. Domestic Value Added in Imports of Manufactured Goods 
Percent of Gross Import Value, 2009 
 
Chemical and 
Non-metallic 
Mineral Products 
Machinery and 
Equipment 
Electrical and 
Optical 
Equipment 
Transport 
Equipment 
China 36.9% 24.3% 42.2% 24.0% 
Germany 39.4% 28.2% 35.9% 34.4% 
Japan 30.6% 30.5% 32.3% 32.9% 
Korea 25.3% 23.4% 39.2% 32.6% 
United Kingdom 37.2% 26.0% 34.6% 33.9% 
United States 32.9% 27.7% 39.3% 32.6% 
Source: OECD-WTO, Statistics on Trade in Value Added. 
Evidence of the tenuous link between output and value added can be seen in China’s soaring 
exports of what U.S. trade data label “advanced technology products,” or ATP, including specified 
electronic and biotechnology goods. While China’s bilateral trade surplus with the United States 
in such products soared from 2002 through 2006, all of the increase was due to processing of 
foreign components in Chinese factories owned, at least in part, by foreign investors. Although 
U.S. exports to China were lower than Chinese exports to the United States, “It appears that ATP 
                                                 
18 Thomas H. Klier and James R. Rubenstein, “Imports of Intermediate Parts in the Auto Industry—A Case Study,” in 
Houseman and Ryder, eds., Measurement Issues Arising from the Growth of Globalization, pp. 226, 231. 
19 Value added in the motor vehicle parts sector, which averaged 41.4% of shipments from 1997 through 2006, 
averaged only 36.8% of shipments from 2007 through 2011, according to Census Bureau data. 
20 Calculated from OECD-WTO, Statistics on Trade in Value Added. For a similar calculation based on 2004 data, see 
Robert Koopman, William Powers, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Give Credit Where Credit Is Due: Tracing Value 
Added in Global Production Chains,” Working Paper 16426, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2010, 
revised March 2011, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16426.pdf. 
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exports from the United States to China are dominated by large scale, sophisticated, high-valued 
equipment and devices at the high end of these industries’ value-added chains, while ATP exports 
from China to the United States are mainly small scale final products or components in the low 
end of the ATP value-added chain,” a recent study concluded.21 
It is questionable whether such studies are able to fully account for all trade conducted within 
global supply chains. In many instances, for example, imported inputs into U.S. manufacturing 
are likely to have been developed in the United States. In 2012, the United States booked $43 
billion of exports of industrial process fees, including royalties and licensing fees, associated with 
production of goods, compared with $23 billion of imports (see Figure 3).22 These fees represent 
payments for intellectual property developed by manufacturing-related companies in the United 
States but used for physical production abroad. 
Figure 3. U.S. Trade in Industrial Process Fees 
Billion Dollars 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions, Table 3a. 
                                                 
21 Michael Ferrantino, Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, Falan Yinug, Ling Chen, Fengjie Qu, and Haifeng Wang, 
“Classification and Statistical Reconciliation of Trade in Advanced Technology Products,” May 2008, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1132748, pp. 38-43, 51. For a study reaching similar conclusions with respect to the sophistication of Chinese 
exports, see Mary Amiti and Caroline Freund, “The Anatomy of China’s Export Growth,” World Bank Development 
Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 4628, May 2008, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&
theSitePK=523679&entityID=000158349_20080527092730&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679. 
22 Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Transactions, Table 3a. 
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The true value of industrial process exports may be much larger than these official data indicate. 
Some 73% of reported exports of industrial process royalties and fees in 2012 stemmed from 
sales by a U.S. company to an affiliated company abroad, and the exporters are free to value those 
intra-firm transactions as they choose when they report them on BEA form BE-125. Those 
exports go disproportionately to countries where income from royalties and licenses receives 
favorable tax treatment: in 2011, 14% of U.S. industrial process exports went to Ireland and 13% 
to Switzerland, while only 4% went to China.23 These factors suggest that it is a common practice 
for U.S. manufacturers to initially assign licenses to their affiliates abroad, resulting in a one-time 
U.S. export of industrial process royalties and fees, after which the repeated relicensing by those 
affiliates to third parties would not be reported as U.S. exports. 
The difficulty in tracing the flow of funds related to intellectual property used in manufacturing 
has major implications for the measurement of value added. Consider, for example, an industrial 
process developed by workers at a manufacturing firm in the United States, licensed by the U.S. 
firm to its Irish affiliate, and then licensed by the Irish affiliate to a Chinese manufacturer. The 
Chinese firm would make payment to Ireland, not to the United States; if the U.S.-origin value 
added in its product is captured in international trade statistics at all, the value would be only the 
arbitrary amount for which the U.S. firm initially transferred the rights to Ireland. Therefore, if 
the Chinese firm exports the manufactured good to the United States, trade statistics may not 
capture the U.S.-origin value in the Chinese export. And if the Chinese export is an input into a 
final product manufactured in the United States, the share of U.S. value added in the final product 
may be underestimated because the true value of the U.S.-origin license used in making the input 
will not be included.24 
Industrial process royalties and license fees are not the only services exports that may be 
intimately connected with manufacturing. Unfortunately, U.S. data are not sufficiently detailed to 
reveal the extent to which other services exports are supplied by manufacturing firms in the 
United States. However, the available data suggest that services likely to have been produced by 
U.S. manufacturers accounted for approximately $94 billion of U.S. exports in 2011.25 If a 
substantial amount of this U.S.-origin value was incorporated into foreign-made products that 
were then exported to the United States, value added in U.S. manufacturing might be higher than 
the $1.7 trillion officially reported by BEA. 
Industry-level data suggest that increased use of imported components may be occurring in some 
manufacturing industries that traditionally have high value added relative to shipments. These 
industries typically are intensive users of scientific research and advanced technology, and are 
often regarded as industries in which the United States should have an international competitive 
advantage. The pharmaceutical, medical instrument, tool and die, and navigation and control 
instrument industries have exhibited declining ratios of domestic value added to shipments over 
the last five years (see Table 3). However, all of these industries are vulnerable to the 
                                                 
23 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Detailed Statistics for cross-border trade, http://www.bea.gov/international/
international_services.htm, Table 4: Royalties and License Fees, viewed April 10, 2013. 
24 The reported U.S. surplus in industrial process royalties equaled 1.2% of value added in U.S. manufacturing in 2011, 
but, as explained in the text, the reported value may not reflect transactions at market prices. 
25 Services that seem likely to have been produced by U.S. manufacturers include industrial process licenses, research 
and development and testing services, operational leasing, industrial engineering, and installation, maintenance, and 
repair of equipment. Estimates of exports of services that may be related to manufacturing are included in Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, detailed statistics for cross-border trade, http://www.bea.gov/international/
international_services.htm, Tables 4 and 7. 
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mismeasurement issues discussed above, as their imported inputs may be likely to draw on 
intellectual property and other services originating in the United States. 
Table 3. Value Added in Five High-Value-Added Industries 
Industry 
2011 Shipments 
($ bn) 
Percent of Value of Industry’s Shipments 
2000 2005 2008 2011 
Semiconductors $81  74.7%  80.7%  74.6%  80.0%  
Pharmaceuticals $146  70.3%  82.4%  74.6%  71.1%  
Medical Instruments $35  74.8%  77.0%  72.4%  72.3%  
Dies and Tools $8  69.3%  69.7%  62.1%  63.1%  
Navigational & 
Control Instruments 
$135  62.3%  71.0%  61.5%  62.5%  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
The data discussed in this report shed light on a concern frequently raised in the context of 
national security, that U.S. manufacturers of vital products are critically dependent upon inputs 
from abroad. Evidence suggests that while the output of U.S. factories contains substantial 
foreign value added, many other countries are even more dependent upon foreign value added 
than is the United States, at least with respect to goods traded in international markets.  
Issues for Congress 
As the research surveyed in this report emphasizes, traditional understandings of “manufacturing” 
are inadequate to explain the process by which goods are produced in the modern world economy. 
For a large number of goods, physical production—activities such as stamping, molding, cutting, 
machining, welding, and assembly—is no longer the heart of the manufacturing process. The bulk 
of the value in many goods comes from activities such as design, product development, 
marketing, and distribution, which are not necessarily performed by the same enterprises, or at 
the same locations, as physical production.26 The declining importance of physical production is 
in evidence in many countries, and is not a phenomenon limited to the United States.27 
The shift to global supply chains has had both positive and negative effects on the U.S. economy. 
There is no doubt that it has contributed to reduced U.S. consumer prices for many manufactured 
products. The availability of imported intermediate inputs has probably preserved some 
manufacturing within the United States, as reliance on higher-cost domestic inputs might well 
make related U.S. final-goods manufacturing uncompetitive. Additionally, the supply chains 
themselves support U.S. jobs in transportation, logistics management, and other fields.  
At the same time, there is widespread agreement that “offshoring” has played a major role in loss 
of factory production work (see Figure 4), leading to higher unemployment and reduced incomes 
for some groups of workers and some communities where import-sensitive manufacturing is 
                                                 
26 See CRS Report R41898, Job Creation in the Manufacturing Revival, by Marc Levinson. 
27 See CRS Report R42135, U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective, by Marc Levinson. 
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located. Two recent studies estimate that the rapid growth of manufactured imports from China 
accounted for a quarter or more of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment in the first 
decade of this century.28 
Figure 4. U.S. Production Employment in Manufacturing  
Million Workers 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics. 
Note: Data are for December of each year, seasonally adjusted. 
The broader impact on the U.S. labor market, however, remains a matter of considerable debate. 
One recent study of the growth of Chinese exports to the European Union between 1999 and 
2007, directly applicable to the United States, concludes that “trade drives out low-tech firms … 
and increases the incentives of incumbents to speed up technical change.”29 This finding 
contradicts the many economic studies that attribute declining factory employment to 
technological change, as it emphasizes that the rate of technological change speeds up when trade 
with low-wage countries increases. It also suggests that declines in manufacturing production 
employment may go hand in hand with increased demand for workers with skills that are in some 
way related to goods production and distribution, but may not fall within the traditional definition 
of “manufacturing” work. 
                                                 
28 Justin R. Pierce and Peter K. Schott, “The Surprisingly Swift Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research working paper 18655, December 2012; David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. 
Hanson, “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, working paper 18054, May 2012. 
29 Nicholas Bloom, Mirko Draca, and John Van Reenen, “Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese 
Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 16717, January 
2011, p. 4. 
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The transformation of manufacturing poses novel issues for public policies aimed at the 
manufacturing sector. A variety of federal programs, from the Hollings Manufacturing Extension 
Partnership administered by the National Institute of Standards and Technology30 to the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative31 to the Small Business Administration’s 504/CDC Loan Guaranty 
Program,32 are designed, in part, to help manufacturers upgrade technology, replace capital stock, 
and compete more effectively in global markets. The extent to which such efforts lead private-
sector firms to select U.S. locations for high-value activities within their supply chains, and the 
degree to which those activities create employment, are unclear. 
More broadly, shifts in the nature of value added in manufacturing put into question the efficacy 
of policies designed to promote factory production within the United States, such as tax policies 
favoring investment in manufacturing equipment and “Buy American” rules requiring certain 
goods financed by the federal government to be produced domestically. Given that employment 
and economic growth are increasingly decoupled from production, it is uncertain whether policies 
oriented to physical manufacturing activity are best suited to achieve desired economic goals. 
Finally, the changes described in this report raise questions about the adequacy of government 
statistics. U.S. statistical agencies have made significant efforts in recent years to improve the 
collection of data on the service sector, corporate spending on research and development, and 
international trade in intangible products. Nonetheless, available data still tend to treat 
manufacturing and services as unrelated economic activities, and it is not clear that existing data 
series on domestic economic activity, trade, and freight transportation completely capture changes 
in the nature of manufacturing, the sources of employment, and the creation of value.  
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